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INTRODUCTION  
  
In January 2006 WorldPublicOpinion.org conducted a poll of Iraqis.  Since then there have been 
numerous developments that raise questions about how the views of the Iraqi people may have 
shifted.  
 
The center of violence in Iraq has shifted geographically into Baghdad, and socially into interethnic 
violence between Shias and Sunnis.  Has this changed attitudes about the presence of US forces—
especially among the Sunnis who may now feel more vulnerable?  
 
Some Iraqi members of parliament have called for the US to give a timetable for the withdrawal of its 
forces.  In the January poll, a majority of Iraqis wanted the US to set a timetable, but there was no 
majority sentiment for a quick withdrawal.  What do the Iraqi people feel now, and does it vary by 
ethnic group?  
 
Attacks on US troops have continued unabated. In January, nearly half of Iraqis approved of attacks 
on US-led forces--but the sense that American troops are now focused on reducing violence in 
Baghdad may have altered the equation. 
 
Meanwhile, the argument among Iraq’s political parties about how decentralized the country’s future 
federal structure will be continues to simmer.  Among Shia leaders there are deep divisions over 
whether or not to set up a largely autonomous region in the south.  While Kurds in the north have 
considerable autonomy now, the size and independence of their future territory remains a subject for 
dispute.  Sunni leaders tend to be hostile to federalism in general.  In America, there has also been 
speculation in policy circles about whether a full partition of Iraq would be the best long-run solution.  
But it is unclear to what degree the centrifugal forces that are undoubtedly in play actually represent 
what ordinary Iraqis think.  
 
The growth of militias, in many cases allied to political parties, has been a deeply troubling 
phenomenon.  It is possible that this very growth in militia membership is a sign that Iraqis are 
turning to them increasingly to meet their need for security.  However, since militia members 
certainly do not constitute a majority of all Iraqis, it is also possible that the apparent trend does not 
coincide with most people’s desires. 
 
In the US, there is a stormy political argument over whether the presence in Iraq of an al Qaeda 
group, active in atrocities against US troops, foreign civilians, and Iraqi civilians alike, means that 
battle lines are now clearly drawn in Iraq between those who stand with the US against al Qaeda and 
those who do the opposite.  But little is known of how the mass of Iraqis view al Qaeda, or whether 
opponents of the US presence are also al Qaeda supporters. 
 
In the context of these dynamics, WorldPublicOpinion.org has undertaken a second poll of the Iraqi 
people to determine their attitudes about these various developments occurring around them, and also 
to differentiate the views of the ethnic subgroups—Arab Sunnis, Shia and Kurds.    
 
The poll was fielded by KA Research Limited/D3 Systems, Inc.  Polling was conducted September 1-
4 with a nationwide sample of 1,150, which included an oversample of Arab Sunnis.  Respondents 
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Key findings are: 
 
VIEWS OF THE US PRESENCE 
 
1. Views of US-led Forces in Iraq 
Seven in ten Iraqis want US-led forces to commit to withdraw within a year.  An overwhelming 
majority believes that the US military presence in Iraq is provoking more conflict than it is 
preventing.  More broadly, most feel the US is having a predominantly negative influence in Iraq and 
have little or no confidence in the US military. If the US made a commitment to withdraw, a majority 
believes that this would strengthen the Iraqi government. Majorities believe that the withdrawal of US 
troops would lead to a reduction in the amount of inter-ethnic violence and improvement in the day-
to-day security of Iraqis.   A modest majority, including a large majority of Shia, now believes that in 
the near future Iraqi security forces will be strong enough to deal with their security challenges 
without foreign forces.  There is little interest in replacing US-led forces with an international 
peacekeeping force..................................................................................................................................4 
 
2. Attacks on US-led Forces   
Support for attacks on US-led forces has grown to a majority position—now six in ten.  Support 
appears to be related to widespread perception, held by all ethnic groups, that the US government 
plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq and would not withdraw its forces from Iraq even if the 
Iraqi government asked it to.  If the US were to commit to withdraw, more than half of those who 
approve of attacks on US troops say that their support for attacks would diminish. ..............................8 
 
3. Views of Al Qaeda  
Growing approval for attacks on US-led forces has not been accompanied by any significant support 
for al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are rejected by overwhelming majorities of Shias and 
Kurds and large majorities of Sunnis. ...................................................................................................10 
 
4. Non-military Forms of US Involvement 
Majorities still approve of the US training Iraqi security forces and helping with community 
development, though most of these feel the US is doing a poor job.  However, a modest majority now 
disapproves of the US being involved in mediating between ethnic groups.  Were the US to agree to a 
timetable for the withdrawal of its forces Iraqis say their support for nonmilitary forms of US 
involvement in Iraq would increase. .....................................................................................................10 
 
VIEWS OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ 
 
5. Support for Strong Central Government, Not Militias   
Iraqis appear to agree on having a strong central government.  Large majorities among all groups 
want the government to get rid of the militias.  Majorities of all groups do not favor a movement 
toward a looser confederation and believe that five years from now Iraq will still be a single state.  A 
large majority sees the current government as the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people. ........11 
 
6. Confidence in Government and Security Forces  
Overall, a large majority expresses confidence in the Maliki government, the Iraqi army, Iraqi interior 
ministry forces and the police.  Sunnis have complex and seemingly conflicting attitudes about the 
government and its security institutions................................................................................................13 
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7.  Mood of the Nation  
The continuing strife and instability in Iraq has diminished optimism among the Iraqi people.  While 
Shias and Kurds still say that the country is headed in the right direction, these majorities have 
diminished and the Sunnis continue to almost unanimously say it is going in the wrong direction.  
Overall, the belief that Iraq is headed in the wrong direction is at a high point and now a slight 
majority.  Majorities of all groups do not think that the level of violence will diminish in the near 
future. The belief that ousting Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships entailed is down sharply, but 
very large majorities of Shia and Kurds continue to believe that it was worth it. ................................ 14 
 
8. Attacks on Iraqis 
Attacks on government security forces and civilians continue to be rejected by very large majorities 
of all groups.  There are differing perceptions of the source of such attacks. The majority of Sunnis 
think that attacks on Sunni civilians mainly come from other Iraqis, while Shias and Kurds believe 
they come from foreign fighters.  A majority of all groups agree that attacks on Shias mostly come 
from foreign fighters. Majorities of all groups believe that the intent of violence against ethnic groups 
is to drive them from their neighborhoods, so that a militia can solidify its power. ............................ 15 
 
9. Views of Shia Leaders  
Prime Minister Maliki is viewed favorably by Kurds as well as Shias, but not at all by Sunnis.  Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani and Muqtada al Sadr are quite divisive figures: overwhelmingly endorsed by Shias 
and overwhelmingly rejected by both Kurds and Sunnis. ................................................................... .16 
 
10. Regional Actors: Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah    
Shias have mildly positive views of Iran and its President, while Kurds and Sunnis have strongly 
negative views.  Shias and Kurds have mostly negative views of Syria, while Sunnis are mildly 
positive. Shias have overwhelmingly positive views of Hezbollah, while Kurds and Sunnis have 
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VIEWS OF THE US PRESENCE 
 
1. Views of US-led Forces in Iraq 
Seven in ten Iraqis want US-led forces to commit to withdraw within a year.  An overwhelming 
majority believes that the US military presence in Iraq is provoking more conflict than it is 
preventing.  More broadly, most feel the US is having a predominantly negative influence in 
Iraq and have little or no confidence in the US military. If the US made a commitment to 
withdraw, a majority believes that this would strengthen the Iraqi government. Majorities 
believe that the withdrawal of US troops would lead to a reduction in the amount of inter-ethnic 
violence and improvement in the day-to-day security of Iraqis.   A modest majority, including a 
large majority of Shia, now believes that in the near future Iraqi security forces will be strong 
enough to deal with their security challenges without foreign forces.  There is little interest in 
replacing US-led forces with an international peacekeeping force.  
 
A large majority of Iraqis—71%—say they would like the Iraqi government to ask for US-led forces 
to be withdrawn from Iraq within a year or less.  Given four options, 37 percent take the position that 
they would like US-led forces withdrawn “within six months,” while another 34 percent opt for 
“gradually withdraw[ing] US-led forces according to a one-year timeline.”  Twenty percent favor a 
two-year timeline and just 9 percent favor “only reduc[ing] US-led forces as the security situation 
improves in Iraq.”   
 
There are significant variations 
between groups in terms of the 
preferred period before US 
withdrawal, though no group favors 
an open-ended commitment.  Fifty-
seven percent of Sunnis favor 
withdrawal in six months, with 
another 34 percent favoring a year.  
Shias are more evenly divided 
between six months (36%) and a year 
(38%), and few favor two years 
(20%) or an open-ended commitment 
(5%).  Only a third of Kurds favor 
withdrawal within a year or less, but 
two-thirds favor withdrawal within 
two years or less (11% six months, 
24% one year, 34% two years). 
Thirty-one percent of Kurds favor an open-ended commitment.  
6 months





Which of the following would you like the Iraqi government 
to ask the US-led forces to do?
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As compared to January 2006 there has been, overall, a growing sense of urgency for withdrawal of 
US-led forces.  In January respondents were only given three options—six months, two years, and an 
open-ended commitment.  In September the one-year option was added, since it has been nearly a 
year since the last time they were asked.  Interestingly the overall numbers follow a consistent 
pattern.  While in January 70 percent favored withdrawal within two years (35% six months, 35% two 
years), now-- approximately a year later—71 percent favor withdrawal within a year (37% six 
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months, 34% one year).  Support for an open-ended commitment has dropped from 29 percent to 9 
percent.   
 
Within ethnic groups there have been some shifts.  Shias show a growing a sense of urgency, with the 
numbers calling for withdrawal in six months rising from 22 percent to 36 percent.  On the other 
hand, the Sunnis’ earlier overwhelming eagerness for withdrawal has moderated, with the percentage 
calling for withdrawal within six months dropping from 83 percent to 57 percent.  Among those 
living in Baghdad support is even lower at 24 percent—however, it should be noted that the sample 
size for this subgroup is quite small and thus should be interpreted with caution.  Still, 91 percent of 
Sunnis now say that they want the US to withdraw within a year, including 84 percent of those in 
Baghdad.   
   
The Kurds have also shifted.  In January a majority of 57 percent wanted US-led forces to only be 
reduced as the security situation improves.  That view has dropped to 31 percent, and now a majority 
of 69 percent want a commitment to withdraw within two years or less.  
 
 
US Presence Seen as Having a Net Negative Effect  
 
Support for US withdrawal appears 
to be derived from a widespread 
perception that the presence of US-
led forces is having a net negative 
effect on the situation in Iraq.  Large 
numbers say that the US military 
presence is “provoking more conflict 
than it is preventing.”  This view is 
held by 78 percent overall, and by 82 
percent of Shias and a near-
unanimous 97 percent of Sunnis.  
The Kurds diverge, with 56 percent 
taking the opposing view that the US 
military presence is “a stabilizing 
force.”  
 
Among those who believe that US 
presence is provoking more conflict 82 percent favor withdrawal of US forces within a year.  Among 
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More broadly, 79 percent of Iraqis say that the US is having a negative influence on the situation in 
Iraq, with just 14 percent saying that it is having a positive influence.   Views are especially negative 
among the Sunnis (96% negative), and the Shias (87% negative).  However, a plurality of Kurds 
(48%) say that the US is having a positive influence, while just 34 percent say it is having a negative 
influence.  
 
Confidence in the US military is quite low.  Eighty-four percent say they have little (22%) or no 
(62%) confidence in the US military.  An extraordinary 98 percent of Sunnis take this view (no 
confidence 85%, a little 13%) as do 91 percent of Shias (no confidence 66%, a little 25%).   However 
a majority of Kurds—55%—express confidence in the US military (some 37%, a lot 18%), while 45 
percent do not express confidence (no confidence 17%, a little 28%).  
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Commitment to Withdraw Seen as Strengthening Government  
 
While many commentators have expressed concern that the withdrawal of US forces would weaken 
or undermine the nascent Iraqi government, a modest majority of Iraqis believes that a commitment to 
withdraw would strengthen it.  Asked “If the US made a commitment to withdraw from Iraq 
according to a timeline, do you think this would strengthen the Iraqi government, weaken it, or have 
no effect either way?” 53 percent said that it would strengthen the government, while just 24 percent 
said it would weaken the government.  Twenty-three percent believed that it would have no effect 
either way.    
 
For all ethnic groups the belief that a 
commitment to withdraw would 
strengthen the government is the 
most common position, but it is more 
prevalent among the Shias (60%), 
than the Sunnis (46%) or Kurds 
(39%).  The belief that it would 
weaken the government is held by 
just 18 percent of Shias, 24 percent 
of Sunnis and 37 percent of Kurds. 
ent.    
 
The belief that withdrawal would 
strengthen the government is 
correlated with support for 
withdrawal.  Among those who 
believe that withdrawal would 
strengthen the government 78 
percent favor withdrawal within a year, as compared to 56 percent among those who believe it would 
weaken the governm
Would a Timeline Strengthen Iraqi Government? 
If the US made a commitment to withdraw from Iraq 
according to a timeline do you think this would 
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While it is not surprising that Iraqis may have enough confidence in the government to reject the idea 
that a US commitment to withdraw militarily would weaken the government, it is not self-evident 
why the largest numbers would take the position that this would strengthen the government.  It may 
be that the presence of US-led forces, because it is an ever-present reminder that the new Iraqi 
government does not exert full sovereignty, is perceived as undermining the government’s authority 
and legitimacy.  
 
Belief US Withdrawal Will Lead to 
Reduced Violence  
 
Iraqis tend to believe that if the US 
were to withdraw, this would reduce 
interethnic violence and increase 
day-to-day security for Iraqis. Asked 
what effect it would have “if US-led 
forces withdraw from Iraq in the next 
six months,” 58 percent overall say 
that violence would decrease (35% a 
lot, 23% a little).  Majorities of Shias 
(57%) and Sunnis (72%) have this 
Effect of US Withdrawal on Violence and Security
[effect on] the amount of inter-ethnic violence
Overall 38 4 58
Increase No effect either way Decrease
WPO 9/2006
1/06 33 5 61
[effect on] day to day security for ordinary Iraqis
Overall 61 5 34
Increase No effect either way Decrease
1/06 67 2 30
If US-led forces withdrew from Iraq in the next six 
months
Effect of S ithdra al on iolence and Security
[effect on] the a ount of inter-ethnic violence
verall
Increase No effect either way Decrease
PO 9/2006
1/06
[effect on] day to day security for ordinary Iraqis
verall
Increase No effect either way Decrease
1/06
If S-led forces ithdre  fro  Iraq in the next six 
onths
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view, though the Kurds are evenly divided.        
 
Similarly, 61 percent said that they think that if the US were to withdraw, “day-to-day security for 
ordinary Iraqis” would increase (a lot 23%, a little 38%).  This was a view held by a large majority of 
Sunnis (78%), a substantial majority of Shias (57%) and even a plurality of Kurds (49% vs. 41% 
decrease). 
 
While the overall percentages on these questions have not shifted substantially since January, there 
have been shifts within ethnic groups. Kurds’ belief that US withdrawal would lead to increased 
violence has dropped from 68 percent to 48 percent.  More interestingly, Sunni and Shia confidence 
that violence would decrease has moderated, from 81 percent to 72 percent among the Sunnis and 64 
percent to 57 percent among the Shias.   
 
Growing Confidence in Iraqi Security Forces  
 
Another factor that may be contributing to Iraqi’s readiness to have US-led forces leave is a growing 
confidence in Iraqi security forces.  Asked to assess the readiness of Iraqi security forces to stand on 
their own in six months, 53 percent 
say that they “will be strong enough 
to deal with the security challenges 
Iraq will face” while 46 percent say 
they “will still need the help of 
military forces from other countries.” 
 
When those who thought Iraqi 
security forces will still need the help 
of foreign forces six months were 
asked how much longer they thought 
this help would be needed, 9 percent 
(of the total sample) said one year, 
21 percent two years and 16 percent 
three years.  Thus 62 percent overall 
believe that Iraqi security forces will 
be able to stand on their own in one 
year.   
Do you think that six months from now Iraqi security forces 
will be:
Perceived Strength of Iraqi Security Forces 
Strong enough to deal with security challenges on own
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This level of confidence is up from January, when only 39 percent thought Iraqi forces would be 
strong enough in six months and 59 percent said they would still need foreign help.  This growth of 
confidence was foreshadowed by the optimism in January of an additional 21 percent saying they 
would be ready in one year and another 26 percent in two years.  
 
The biggest part of this increase in confidence has come from Shias, 68 percent of whom now believe 
in the abilities of Iraqi forces—up from 45 percent in January.  This view has grown among Kurds as 
well—up to 40 percent, from 22 percent in January, though 57 percent of Kurds still think foreign 
forces will be necessary.  Sunnis, on the contrary, express declining confidence in Iraqi security 
forces.  Confidence has dropped from 38 percent to 24 percent—reflecting perhaps their 
dissatisfaction with the ability of Iraqi security forces to protect them from attacks, or their perception 
of infiltration by militia groups.     
 
A large majority expresses confidence in the Iraqi army.  Sixty-four percent say they have some 
(40%) or a lot (24%) of confidence in the army.  Interestingly, Kurds express the most confidence 
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with 79 percent saying they have some or a lot of confidence, followed by the Shias (65%).  Even 46 
percent of Sunnis express confidence, though more (54%) have little or no confidence.  
 
Little Interest in Replacement By International Force  
 
Among all ethnic groups there is little interest in the idea of replacing US-led forces with an 
international peacekeeping force, even if it is manned primarily by other Islamic countries.  
Respondents were asked what they would most favor over the next year and offered three options.  
Only 20 percent overall favored the idea of “replacing US-led forces with an international 
peacekeeping force mostly from Islamic countries,” with only slight variations between groups.  
 
By far the most popular option—endorsed by 65%—was “withdrawing all foreign military forces 
from Iraq.” Three in four Shias and Sunnis endorsed this idea, but only one in four Kurds.    
 
The option of “maintaining US-led forces in Iraq” was endorsed by a mere 14 percent, with Shia and 
Sunnis support being in single digits.  However a plurality of Kurds (48%) favored it.  
 
    
2. Attacks on US-led Forces   
Support for attacks on US-led forces has grown to a majority position—now six in ten.  Support 
appears to be related to widespread perception, held by all ethnic groups, that the US 
government plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq and would not withdraw its forces 
from Iraq even if the Iraqi government asked it to.  If the US were to commit to withdraw, more 
than half of those who approve of attacks on US troops say that their support for attacks would 
diminish.  
 
Support for attacks against US-led forces has increased sharply to 61 percent (27% strongly, 34% 
somewhat).  This represents a 14-point increase from January 2006, when only 47 percent of Iraqis 
supported attacks.   
 
This change is due primarily to a 
dramatic 21-point increase among 
Shias, whose approval of attacks has 
risen from 41 percent in January to 
62 percent in September. A very 
large majority (86%) of Kurds 
disapprove of attacks (59% strongly), 
with only 15 percent supporting 
them.  Kurdish disapproval is up 
slightly from January, when it was 81 
percent, but approval of attacks has 
held constant. Similarly, Sunni 
support for attacks has remained 
relatively constant with 92 percent 
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Though Sunnis still overwhelmingly approve of attacks, the intensity of their support has moderated 
somewhat.  The percentage saying that they approve of attacks strongly has dropped from 77 percent 
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in January to 55 percent today.  This may be related to the decline (mentioned above) in the size of 
the Sunni majority calling for withdrawal of US-led forces in six months.  
 
Belief that US Plans Permanent Bases in Iraq  
 
Naturally the question arises:  If only one in three Iraqis favors US withdrawal in the shortest possible 
time frame of six months, why then is support for attacks on US-led forces as high as 61 percent?  
Indeed, among those who approve of such attacks, only 50 percent favor withdrawal in six months—
though another 37 percent favor it in a year.   
 
It is always difficult to know why people have certain attitudes, but some findings are strongly 
suggestive.  A large majority of Iraqis—and a majority in all ethnic groups-- believes that the US 
plans to maintain permanent military bases in Iraq and would not withdraw its forces if the Iraqi 
government asked it to.  Among those who support attacks this belief is especially high, while those 
who do not support attacks mostly believe that it is not the case.  This suggests that some Iraqis 
approve of such attacks, not because they are so eager for the US-led forces to get out immediately, 
but because they want to put pressure on the US to get out eventually.  
 
Asked whether they think “the US 
government plans to have permanent 
military bases in Iraq or to remove all 
its military forces once Iraq is 
stabilized,” 77 percent of respondents 
say that the US plans to have 
permanent military bases.  This view 
is held by a majority of Kurds (58%), 
as well as Shias (73%) and virtually 
all Sunnis (97%).   
 
Perhaps more significant, 
approximately the same number—
78%—believe that “If the new Iraqi 
government were to tell the US to 
withdraw all of its forces within six 
months,” the US would refuse to do 
so.  Here again this view is held by a majority of all groups—64 percent of Kurds, 76 percent of Shias 
and 96 percent of Sunnis.   
Does US Plan Permanent Bases?
WPO 9/2006
Do you think the US government plans to have permanent military 
bases in Iraq or to remove all its military forces once Iraq is 
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The belief that the US plans to have permanent bases in Iraq is highly correlated with support for 
attacks on US-led forces.  Among those who believe this, 68 percent approve of attacks.  Among 
those who believe that the US plans to withdraw once Iraq is stabilized, only 34 percent approve of 
attacks.  Beliefs about whether the US would respond to an Iraqi government request to withdraw 
follow the same pattern.   
 
There is also some evidence that if the US were to make a commitment to withdraw according to a 
timetable, support for attacks would diminish.  The 61 percent who said they approved of attacks 
were asked: “If the US made a commitment to withdraw from Iraq according to a timetable, would 
you feel less supportive of attacks against US-led forces or would it make no difference?”  Most of 
these—36% (of the full sample)—said that they would feel less supportive, while 23 percent said it 
would make no difference.   Those saying they would feel less supportive included 43 percent of the 
Shias and 42 percent of the Sunnis.  
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3. Views of Al Qaeda  
Growing approval for attacks on US-led forces has not been accompanied by any significant 
support for al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are rejected by overwhelming 
majorities of Shias and Kurds and large majorities of Sunnis.  
 
It may be easy to assume that as the Iraqi people become more supportive of attacks on US-led forces, 
they may grow warmer toward al Qaeda—the probable source of a significant number of attacks on 
US forces.  However, this does not appear to be the case. Al Qaeda is exceedingly unpopular among 
the Iraqi people.      
 
Overall 94 percent have an unfavorable view of al Qaeda, with 82 percent expressing a very 
unfavorable view.  Of all organizations and individuals assessed in this poll, it received the most 
negative ratings.   The Shias and Kurds show similarly intense levels of opposition, with 95 percent 
and 93 percent respectively saying they have very unfavorable views.  The Sunnis are also quite 
negative, but with less intensity.  
Seventy-seven percent express an 
unfavorable view, but only 38 
percent are very unfavorable.  
Twenty-three percent express a 
favorable view (5% very).  
 
Views of Osama bin Laden are only 
slightly less negative.  Overall 93 
percent have an unfavorable view, 
with 77 percent very unfavorable.  
Very unfavorable views are 
expressed by 87 percent of Kurds 
and 94 percent of Shias.  Here again, 
the Sunnis are negative, but less 
unequivocally—71 percent have an 
unfavorable view (23% very), and 29 
percent a favorable view (3% very).  
Al Qaeda
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4. Non-military Forms of US Involvement 
Majorities still approve of the US training Iraqi security forces and helping with community 
development, though most of these feel the US is doing a poor job.  However, a modest majority 
now disapproves of the US being involved in mediating between ethnic groups.  Were the US to 
agree to a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces Iraqis say their support for nonmilitary 
forms of US involvement in Iraq would increase. 
  
Respondents were asked to assess non-military forms of US involvement in Iraq.   Almost two-thirds 
(63%) continue to approve of the US training Iraqi security forces, though most of these (41% of the 
full sample) think the US is doing a poor job.  Support is especially high among Shias (64%) and 
Kurds (93%) though only 19 percent of Shias say the US is doing a good job, as compared to 50 
percent of Kurds.  Sixty-four percent of Sunnis are opposed to the US being involved in this way.  
 
Support has eroded somewhat from January, when 77 percent approved. The biggest change has 
come from Shias, whose support has dropped a sharp 25 points from 89 percent—perhaps part of a 
growing orientation to US disengagement.  Interestingly, opposition among Sunnis has dropped 10 
verall
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points from 74 percent—consistent with a general softening of intense opposition to all things 
American.  The Kurds’ strong support is unchanged. 
 
A larger majority (68%) approves of the US “helping Iraqis organize their communities to address 
local needs such as building schools and health clinics.”  But here again most of these—41% (of the 
full sample)—believes that the US is doing a poor job.  Here too support is strongest among Shias 
(71%) and Kurds (87%).  Fifty-nine percent of Sunnis are opposed.    
 
While overall changes in attitudes since January are not significant, there has been a 12 point drop in 
Shia approval (from 83% to 71%), and once again a sharp drop (21 points) in Sunni disapproval 
(from 80% to 59%).  The Kurds’ high approval has been unchanged.  
 
A striking shift has occurred in regard to the US “helping to mediate between ethnic groups.”  While 
in January 65 percent approved of such US involvement, this has dropped sharply to 47 percent, with 
52 percent disapproving.  Furthermore, only 8 percent believe the US is doing a good job.  
 
The biggest change occurred among Shias, with support dropping from 76 percent to 43 percent and 
opposition rising from 24 percent to 57 percent.  But here again, Sunni opposition has softened from 
81 percent to 70 percent.  Kurdish support has been largely stable, now at 83 percent.  
 
It appears that if the US were make a commitment to withdraw, support for nonmilitary forms of US 
involvement would increase.  Those that expressed disapproval of any of the forms of nonmilitary 
involvement (65% of the sample) were asked, “If the US were to agree to a timetable for withdrawing 
its forces, would that make you more likely to approve of the US being involved in Iraq in these 
nonmilitary ways, or would it make no difference?”  More than half of this group (37% of the full 
sample) said that it would make them more likely to approve of nonmilitary forms of US 
involvement, while 27 percent said it would make no difference.   
 
Shias were especially responsive, with 45 percent saying that it would make them more supportive 
and 22 percent saying it would make no difference.  Sunnis were more intransigent in their 
opposition, with 33 percent saying that it would make them more supportive and 50 percent saying 
that it would make not difference.  Kurds were largely supportive in the first place.  
 
VIEWS OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ 
 
5. Support for Strong Central Government, Not Militias   
Iraqis appear to agree on having a strong central government.  Large majorities among all 
groups want the government to get rid of the militias.  Majorities of all groups do not favor a 
movement toward a looser confederation and believe that five years from now Iraq will still be 
a single state.  A large majority sees the current government as the legitimate representative of 
the Iraqi people.  
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Though Iraqis express widespread 
negativity about the US presence in 
Iraq, there are some encouraging 
signs for the future of the Iraqi 
government.  Reports of conflict in 
Iraq may give the impression that the 
central government is so weak and 
unpopular that Iraq is on the verge of 
fragmenting into a very loose 
confederation if not complete 
partition, and that major sectors of 
the population are aligning 
themselves with militias out of a 
widespread lack of confidence in the 
central government. However, the 
findings of the poll suggest quite a 













Government and the Militias
Would you prefer to have a strong government that would 
get rid of all militias or do you think it would be better to 









ntinue to ave ilitias 
Sunni
21




r t  t  iliti s
ould you prefer to have a strong govern ent that ould 
get rid of all ilitias or do you think it ould be better to 




Sunni   
 
The militias appear to be quite 
unpopular and very large majorities 
of all groups favor a strong 
government that would get rid of the 
militias.  Just 21 percent overall—
and a minority of all groups—say 
that they think “it would be better to 
continue to have militias to protect 
[their] security.”  Rather, 77 percent 
overall say that they would “prefer to 
have a strong government that would 
get rid of all militias.”  This view is 
held by 82 percent of Kurds, 65 
percent of Shias and an extraordinary 
100 percent of Sunnis.  
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Iraqis appear to agree on having a 
strong central government rather than 
changing the present system in favor 
of a looser confederation.  Asked 
whether “the new Iraqi system of 
government grants the central 
government too much power, too 
little power, or about the right 
amount of power,” only 37 percent 
overall say that it grants too much 
power.   The group with the largest 
percentage holding this view is the 
Sunnis, but still this is a minority of 
46 percent.  Overall 61 percent say 
that the central government is 
granted too little power (35%) or 











How likely do you think it is that 5 years from now Iraq 
will still be a single state?
Iraq a Single State in 5 Years?










ery/So e hat likely
o  likely do you think it is that 5 years fro  no  Iraq 
ill still be a single state?
Ir   i l  t t  i   rs?









    WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG / PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES 12 
The Iraqi Public on US Presence and the Future of Iraq                     September 27, 2006 
 
(26%).  Interestingly, it is the Kurds who have the highest percentage (42%) saying that the central 
government has too little power. 
 
Iraqis also express confidence that Iraq will survive as a single state.  Asked, “How likely do you 
think it is that five years from now Iraq will still be a single state?” 72 percent overall say that it is 
very (30%) or somewhat likely (42%), while just 28 percent say it is not very likely (24%) or not at 
all likely (4%).  Majorities of all groups express this confidence, including 80 percent of Shias, 65 
percent of Kurds, and 56 percent of Sunnis.  
 
Most Iraqis (65%) see the current Iraqi government as “the legitimate representative of the Iraqi 
people.”  However, while 82 percent of Shias and 76 percent of Kurds feel this way, 86 percent of 
Sunnis do not.  
 
 
6. Confidence in Government and Security Forces  
Overall, a large majority expresses confidence in the Maliki government, the Iraqi army, Iraqi 
interior ministry forces and the police.  Sunnis have complex and seemingly conflicting attitudes 
about the government and its security institutions.  
 
Despite Iraq’s troubles, a large majority expresses confidence in the government led by Prime 
Minister Nouri Maliki.  Sixty-three percent say that “in its effort to deal with Iraq’s problems,” the 
government is doing a very good job (17%) or a somewhat good job (46%). 
 
Large majorities also express 
confidence in Iraqi government 
forces’ ability to protect their 
security.  As mentioned above, 64 
percent say they have some (40%) or 
a lot (24%) of confidence in the Iraqi 
army.  Though controversy has 
swirled around Interior Ministry 
forces, they fare only a little less 
well, with 62 percent expressing 
some (34%) or a lot (28%) of 
confidence.  For the police, 71 
percent express some (34%) or a lot 
(37%) of confidence. 
 
Perhaps most significantly, when 
asked “Do you feel that if all militias were to disarm now, that you could or could not rely on the 
government alone to ensure security in your area?” a large 68 percent say they feel they could.  
Iraqi Interior Ministry
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Complex Sunni Attitudes   
 
While Shias and Kurds are similar in their confidence in Iraqi security forces and approval of the 
performance of the Maliki government, Sunnis express more complex attitudes.  On one hand, a large 
93 percent say that if all the militias were to disarm, they could rely on the government to ensure their 
security, and a striking 100 percent would “prefer to have a strong government that would get rid of 
all militias.”  
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On the other hand, Sunnis express low confidence in the Iraqi government and its security 
institutions. Eighty-two percent say that the Maliki government is doing a bad job. Seventy-six 
percent say that they have no confidence at all in the Iraqi Interior Ministry forces (often reputed to be 
a Shia stronghold) and 77 percent express little or no confidence in the police to protect their security.   
The only institution that that engenders a bit of confidence is the army (perhaps because it is under a 
Sunni defense minister), for which 46 percent of Sunnis say they have at least some confidence, 
though 54 percent say they have little or no confidence.  
 
This seeming contradiction may be explained as follows.  Sunnis support a strong central government 
in principle and would like to see the government get rid of the militias, most of which pose a threat 
to the Sunnis.  At the same time, the dominance of Shias in the government, and especially its 
security institutions, do not engender full confidence in Sunnis that they will be protected and remind 
them of their continuing resentment that they were displaced as the dominant ethnic group. 
 
7.  Mood of the Nation  
The continuing strife and instability in Iraq has diminished optimism among the Iraqi people.  
While Shias and Kurds still say that the country is headed in the right direction, these 
majorities have diminished and the 
Sunnis continue to almost 
unanimously say it is going in the 
wrong direction.  Overall, the belief 
that Iraq is headed in the wrong 
direction is at a high point and now 
a slight majority.  Majorities of all 
groups do not think that the level of 
violence will diminish in the near 
future. The belief that ousting 
Saddam Hussein was worth the 
hardships entailed is down sharply, 
but very large majorities of Shia 
and Kurds continue to believe that 
it was worth it.   
 
The conflict and instability in Iraq has 
taken its toll.  A majority of Shias 
(59%) and Kurds (64%) continue to 
say that the country is going in the 
right direction, but these numbers are 
down sharply from January when 84 
percent of Shias and 76 percent of 
Kurds expressed optimism.  
Combined with the unchanged 93 
percent of Sunnis saying that the 
country is going in the wrong 
direction, a slight majority of Iraqis 
(52%) now say that the country is 
headed in the wrong direction—one 
of the  highest recorded in a long 
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Majorities of all ethnic groups believe that six months from now the level of violence will be the 
same or higher than it is today.  Overall, 31 percent expect the violence to be about the same and 30 
percent expect it to be higher; only 38 percent think it will go down.  Sunnis are the most pessimistic, 
with only 23 percent believing that the violence will go down and 43 percent assuming that it will 
rise.  
 
Ousting Saddam Hussein  
 
A majority of Iraqis (61%) still believe that ousting Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they 
might have suffered, however this is down sharply from the 77 percent who said this in January.  
Among Shias, the majority saying 
that was worth it has slipped from 98 
percent to 75 percent, while among 
the Kurds it has dropped from 91 
percent to 81 percent; the minorities 
saying it was not worth it has gone 
up to 23 percent among Shias and 18 
percent among Kurds.  The number 
of Sunnis saying it was not worth it 
has drifted upward from 83 percent 
to 89 percent, with only 11 percent 
saying that it was worth it. 
 
However it should be noted that the 
current level of belief that Saddam’s 
ouster was worth the hardships is 
more consistent with previous 
findings by Gallup in 2004.  The January 2006 finding of 77% may have been influenced by 
optimism over the election in December 2005. 
Thinking about any hardships you might have suffered since 
the US-Britain invasion, do you personally think that ousting 
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8. Attacks on Iraqis 
Attacks on government security forces and civilians continue to be rejected by very large 
majorities of all groups.  There are differing perceptions of the source of such attacks. The 
majority of Sunnis think that attacks on Sunni civilians mainly come from other Iraqis, while 
Shias and Kurds believe they come from foreign fighters.  A majority of all groups agree that 
attacks on Shias mostly come from foreign fighters. Majorities of all groups believe that the 
intent of violence against ethnic groups is to drive them from their neighborhoods, so that a 
militia can solidify its power.   
 
Attacks on government security forces and civilians continue to be rejected by overwhelming 
majorities of all groups, just as they were in January.  Ninety-six percent disapprove of attacks on 
Iraqi government security forces, and 68 percent disapprove strongly.  One hundred percent 
disapprove of attacks on civilians (97% strongly).  
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Sunnis are a little less emphatic in 
their opposition to attacks on Iraqi 
security forces: while 86 percent 
disapprove, only 29 percent 
disapprove strongly. Fourteen 
percent approve somewhat of these 
attacks, but only 1 percent expresses 
strong approval.  However, Sunnis 
are no different in their total 
opposition to attacks on civilians, 
with 99 percent disapproving (95% 
trongly). 
eign fighters or from other Iraqis.   
s
 
There are substantial variations in the 
perceptions of who is perpetrating 
attacks on Iraqi civilians. 
Respondents were asked in two 
separate questions whether they thought attacks on Sunni civilians, and on Shia civilians, mainly 
come from for
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When it came to attacks on Sunni civilians the majority of Sunnis (69%) thought the attacks mainly 
came from other Iraqis—presumably by Shia death squads. However the majority of Shias (63%) 
thought these attacks were primarily coming from foreign fighters, and a modest majority of Kurds 
(52%) agreed.  
 
When it came to attacks on Shia civilians a majority of Shia (57%) thought that the attacks were 
primarily coming from foreign fighters. A large majority of Kurds (63%) and a modest majority of 
Sunnis (53%) agreed.  This may be influenced by claims al Qaeda in Iraq has made about attacks on 
Shias.  
 
Majorities of all groups believe that the intent of violence against ethnic groups is to drive them from 
their neighborhoods, so that a militia can solidify its power.  Overall, two-thirds (67%) ascribed 
“some” (39%) or “most” (28%) of the violence against ethnic groups to this purpose; 76 percent of 
Shias, 56 percent of Sunnis, and 52 percent of Kurds held this view. 
 
 
9. Views of Shia Leaders  
Prime Minister Maliki is viewed favorably by Kurds as well as Shias, but not at all by Sunnis.  
Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Muqtada al Sadr are quite divisive figures: overwhelmingly 
endorsed by Shias and overwhelmingly rejected by both Kurds and Sunnis.  
 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is the only major Shia leader with appeal that reaches beyond his own 
ethnic group.  Fifty-eight percent of Kurds view him favorably, as do 86 percent of Shias (45% very).  
However, an overwhelming 85 percent of Sunnis view him unfavorably (48% very).  
 
Though Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr are quite at odds with each other 
on the direction of Iraq, they both get overwhelming support from Shias.  Sistani is seen favorably by 
95 percent of Shias (77% very), while Muqtada al-Sadr is viewed favorably by 81 percent (52% 
very).   
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However, neither are viewed 
favorably by Kurds or Sunnis.  
Sistani is viewed unfavorably by 78 
percent of Kurds (39% very) and 95 
percent of Sunnis (50% very).  
Muqtada al-Sadr is viewed 
unfavorably by 94 percent of Kurds 










































10. Regional Actors: Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah    
Shias have mildly positive views of Iran and its President, while Kurds and Sunnis have 
strongly negative views.  Shias and Kurds have mostly negative views of Syria, while Sunnis are 
mildly positive. Shias have overwhelmingly positive views of Hezbollah, while Kurds and Sunnis 
have negative views.  
 
Some observers fear that with the 
ascension of Shias to a dominant role 
in Iraq, there is potential for the 
formation of an alliance between Iraq 
and Shia-dominated Iran.  This poll 
does not suggest any such 
proclivities in Iraqi public opinion, as 
Shias show only mildly positive 
attitudes toward Iran, while Kurds 
and Sunnis are quite negative.  Asked 
whether Iran is having a mostly 
positive or negative influence on the 
situation in Iraq, just 45 percent of 
Shias say it is having a positive 
influence (negative 28%, neutral 
27%), while Iran’s influence is 
viewed a mostly negative by large 
majorities
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 of Kurds (71%) and Sunnis (94%).   
 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does a bit better among Shias, with 64 percent having a 
very (28%) or somewhat (36%) favorable view.  But Kurds have a largely unfavorable view (very 
43%, somewhat 34%) and the Sunnis an exceedingly unfavorable view (very 80%, somewhat 17%).  
 
While some have expressed fears of Syria being a link in an emerging Shia crescent (though very few 
Syrians are Shia), public opinion in Iraq would hardly be the cement.  Most Shias (68%) think Syria 
is having a negative influence on Iraq’s situation, as do most Kurds (63%).  Sunnis are only mildly 
positive, with 41 percent having a favorable view (17% negative, 43% neutral).  
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Hezbollah elicits highly polarized views. An overwhelming 91 percent of Shias have a very (50%) or 
somewhat favorable (41%) view of Hezbollah, while an equally large 93 percent of Kurds have a very 
(64%) or somewhat (29%) unfavorable view.  Sunnis are also fairly negative, with 59 percent having 

















































PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL  
POLICY ATTITUDES (PIPA) 
1779 MASSACHUSETTS AVE. NW, SUITE 510, WASHINGTON, DC 20036,  
PHONE: 202-232-7500, FAX: 202-232-1159 
INFO@PIPA.ORG 
HTTP://WWW.WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG
HTTP://WWW.PIPA.ORG  
 
 
 
